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Abstract
This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy
with incomplete markets subject to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We focus
on the role of securitization, whereby borrowers can reduce idiosyncratic asset risk,
which enables increased leverage and investment. In the absence of frictions in the
securitization process, we show that the ability to securitize assets completes markets.
When there are frictions in the market for securitized assets, requiring originators to
hold some skin-in-the-game, markets remain incomplete and risk-sharing is limited. In
this case, fire-sales are required to repay debt and finance new investments when the
economy is hit by a negative shock. Moreover, the equilibrium may be constrained
inefficient due to the existence of a pecuniary externality that can result in over or
under-investment. In the over-investment case, the imposition of a leverage restriction
generates a Pareto improvement by raising prices in the event of a fire-sale. Forcing
originators to hold additional skin-in-the-game can also increase prices in a fire-sale,
however such a policy is shown to reduce welfare.
JEL codes: D52, D53, E44, G18, G23.
Keywords: Securitization, pecuniary externalities, collateral constraints, financial frictions,
macroprudential regulation, fire-sales, incomplete markets.
∗Comments and suggestions on this document are welcome.
1 Introduction
In an economy with financial frictions, securitization can enhance risk-sharing oppor-
tunities by substituting for missing markets. Specifically, when asset returns are subject
to idiosyncratic risk and markets for hedging such risk are limited or nonexistent, pooling
assets via securitization provides additional insurance. As a result, securitization can raise
aggregate investment and leverage as borrowers are able to issue safer liabilities to risk-
averse lenders. However, as has been shown in the literature, competitive equilibria may
exhibit socially excessive aggregate investment when markets are incomplete.1 Thus, while
securitization enhances risk-sharing it may amplify over-investment, and as such the welfare
implications of securitization may be ambiguous.2 To our knowledge, these effects have not
been examined in the literature and we attempt to fill this gap.
To analyze the welfare implications of securitization we develop a dynamic general equi-
librium model of investment and securitization with incomplete markets. When securitiza-
tion is an imperfect substitute for missing markets, such that risk-sharing is limited by a
skin-in-the-game constraint on sellers, we show that competitive equilibria may be charac-
terized by socially excessive investment and leverage. In this case, a planner facing the same
constraints as the private market can engineer a Pareto improvement by reducing financial
sector leverage. The improvement arises from an increase in the price of assets in the event
of a fire-sale, which transfers resources to individuals that have the most productive use for
them. Surprisingly, requiring sellers to hold more skin-in-the-game, which indirectly impacts
leverage and raises prices in a fire-sale as well, is always welfare reducing.
The paper develops a three-period model of investment. In period 0, risk-neutral bor-
rowers with limited capital, who we refer to as intermediaries, obtain funds from risk-averse
investors to finance investment projects. Investments are either successful early (period 1),
successful late (period 2), or fail late and return nothing. While ex-ante homogeneous, in-
1For example, see Lorenzoni (2008).
2Generally, additional markets need not increase welfare, as first shown in Hart (1975).
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termediaries differ at period 1 as returns on their individual investments may arrive early
or late. Those with early returns (early types) will have sufficient funds to meet their debt
obligations and to invest in new opportunities that arrive in period 1. Intermediaries that
do not have early returns (late types) will be required to raise funds. Importantly, financial
frictions rule out state-contingent contracts at period 0 and borrowing at period 1. As a
result, late types will sell assets to early types via a spot market to generate funds to invest in
new opportunities and/or to service existing debt. However, late types may be constrained
in their ability to raise funds, forgoing positive NPV investments and creating a “credit
crunch.” The extent to which late borrowers are constrained is dependent on the prevailing
asset price, which in turn depends on the aggregate funds early types have and the aggregate
quantity of assets for sale. Crucially, atomistic intermediaries do not anticipate the impact
of their period 0 investment and securitization decisions on the price of assets at period 1.
Therefore, a pecuniary externality arises that can result in period 0 investment that is either
insufficient or excessive from a social perspective.
In the model, securitization mitigates financial frictions by moving funds from early
to late types at period 1, substituting for contingent contracts that would provide such
transfers. This allows intermediaries to create more safe debt for risk-averse investors by
increasing the amount of pledgeable income when their returns are late. This is a standard
partial equilibrium view of how securitization increases can lead to increased leverage and
investment.3 However, our framework also highlights a novel aspect of securitization; that
securitization affects spot market prices by changing the distribution of cash in the market.
Specifically, with more securitization at period 0, demand for assets at time 1 declines since
the funds of early types are reduced. On the supply side, late types require less funds and
have more assets to sell. This results in a reduction in the price of assets at period 1, creating
a transfer from late to early types and thereby amplifying the pecuniary externality.
Our framework allows us to shed new light on the welfare implications of policies to curb
3See for example DeMarzo (2005), Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) and Kiff and Kisser (2014).
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excessive leverage in the financial sector. We show that investment is generally inefficient
when securitization is not complete and that leverage restrictions, akin to those outlined
in Basel III, can be welfare improving when the competitive equilibrium is characterized
by too much investment. When there is excessive leverage, it seems plausible that recent
policies designed to restrict the extent of securitization in the financial system could also
increase welfare, since securitization affects leverage indirectly. For example, the retention
requirements in the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act and the European Capital Requirements Direc-
tive.4 Indirect policies such as these are important from a practical perspective because they
require significantly less information than direct restrictions on the balance sheet, such as
capital or leverage constraints. Perhaps more importantly, market restrictions on skin-in-
the-game could influence the leverage of non-regulated institutions, since securitized lending
is at the heart of so-called “shadow banking”. We show that the total effect of forcing more
skin-in-the-game can be decomposed into a direct effect and a price effect. There is a direct
tightening of the constraints on late intermediaries, which reduces the collateral value of in-
vestments, causing them to reduce leverage ex-ante. On the other hand, reduced aggregate
investment increases the price of assets in a fire-sale, which increases the collateral value of
assets and results in increased leverage. The direct effect is obvious and provides an intuitive
rationale for tightening constraints as a means to reduce excessive investment. However, this
is undone by the price effect, leaving the negative impact of the tighter constraint to domi-
nate. This makes clear that the rationale for policies to increase skin-in-the-game as a means
to reduce excessive leverage cannot rely solely on partial equilibrium arguments.
For our results to obtain we require market incompleteness coupled with frictions in the
securitization process. The missing markets we assume are a precondition for securitized
lending, since the existence of contingent securities at period 0 or frictionless borrowing at
period 1 eliminates the value in securitizing assets in our model. While we are agnostic
4Specifically Article 122a of the European Capital Requirements Directive and Section 941 of the U.S.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act both require a five percent minimum retention
rate by securitizers or originators, with exceptions for various types of underlying assets. Notably, “qualified”
residential mortgage backed securities, which are backed by loans that meet a specific underwriting criteria.
3
about the specific market failure(s) that result in borrowing constraints, the literature has
highlighted a number of possibilities. For example, limits to borrowing may be justified by
the presence of asymmetric information as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), limited commitment
following Kehoe and Levine (1993), or moral hazard as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). The
assumption that issuers of securitized assets may be forced to hold some skin-in-the-game
is also vital. The reasons for this are not modeled in the paper, but can be motivated by
the existence of an informational asymmetry between originators of securities and outsiders.
This type of argument is made formal in DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), who find that issuers
holding skin-in-the-game is an optimal contractual arrangement in the presence of issuer
private information. This can arise in other interpretations, such as Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), where this type of structure arises to address moral hazard.5 This assumption can
also be supported by new regulations (discussed below) that force issuers of securitized assets
to retain economic exposure in an effort to ensure their interests align with investors.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the study of pecuniary externalities which arise from incomplete
markets. This literature goes back to the seminal work of Hart (1975), Diamond (1980),
Stiglitz (1982), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
These insights have been influential on the extensive literature focusing on the limited pledge-
ability of future cash flows.6 In our application, market incompleteness precludes individuals
from equalizing marginal returns to investment. This is similar to the type of friction studied
in Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001), Allen and Gale (2004), Lorenzoni (2008), Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009),
Davila, Hong, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2012), He and Kondor (forthcoming) and Mirza and
5Cerasi and Rochet (2014) provide a model of securitization of this type in which banks hold an equity
tranche to maintain proper incentives. However, when the initial investment need not be raised in conjunction
with securitization, the skin-in-the game requirement need not be part of the optimal contract as shown by
Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (2012).
6Krishnamurthy (2010) or Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) survey the literature.
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Stephens (2016), among others.7 This paper shows how pecuniary externalities may result in
inefficient investment when the securitization process is plagued by frictions. Thus, we link
the literature on investment with incomplete markets and asset securitization. This allows
us to study welfare and examine policies in a well-understood framework.
Our model of securitization is an extension of the framework developed in Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny (2013). In their setting, securitization is socially worthwhile as it
can completely remove idiosyncratic risk from financial intermediaries’ assets. This permits
the financial sector to become more leveraged and invest more.8 This is inefficient when
agents are not rational and cannot assess the risks in securitized assets correctly. In our
paper, market incompleteness limits the ability of intermediaries to insure themselves against
idiosyncratic asset risk. Furthermore, aggregate investment is excessive due to a coordination
failure only when markets are incomplete, which results in inefficient fire-sales even when all
agents have rational expectations.
2 Model
There are three periods; t = 0, 1, 2. There are two principal actors; risk-neutral interme-
diaries (borrowers) and risk-averse investors (savers). We describe each further below.
2.1 Intermediaries
The economy is populated by a measure one of risk-neutral intermediaries, indexed by
j, that have access to risky investment projects at both t = 0, and t = 1 that either succeed
or fail. Undertaking investment is costly with intermediaries incurring non-pecuniary costs
c(I) for investing I units. We assume that c(·) is an increasing and convex function with
with c(0) = c′(0) = 0. We interpret these as the effort costs required to find and maintain
7See Davila (2015) for a discussion of several key papers in this literature, including the impact of various
modeling assumptions on welfare analysis. In the terminology of Davila (2015), we model a “terms-of-trade”
externality.
8Diamond (1984) first showed risk-pooling by financial intermediaries can increase investment and welfare.
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quality investments.
Each intermediary has access to risky investment opportunities at t = 0 with returns
subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. Investments can either succeed, in which
case gross returns per unit of investment are R0, or fail and return nothing. Moreover, t = 0
investments may succeed early, at t = 1, or late, at t = 2, while failure is only learned late.
Importantly, the probability of success is identical and independent across intermediaries.
As a result, intermediaries have different resources at t = 1 even though they are identical
at t = 0. The probability of success, pi(ω), varies with the aggregate state ω ∈ Ω ≡ {g, b, r}
realized at t = 2. The state g captures a “good” or “growth” state where all intermediaries’
projects succeed, b captures a “bad” state where a number of projects fail, while r captures
an even less productive “recession” state such that pi(g) = 1 > pi(b) > pi(r) = l > 0. We
denote the probability that state ω is realized by φ(ω), and define φ(g) = p, φ(b) = (1− p)q,
φ(r) = (1− p)(1− q), where p, q ∈ (0, 1).
At t = 1, a fraction σ ∈ Σ ≡ {h, l} of t = 0 projects succeed. We assume σ is publicly
observable and provides an informative signal about the realization of the aggregate state ω
at t = 2. The signal h (high) is observed with probability p and conveys that the aggregate
state at t = 2 is good (g) with certainty. Alternatively, with probability 1 − p the signal l
(low) is observed and it conveys that the aggregate state may be either bad (b) or a recession
(r).9 For simplicity, we assume that if the high signal is observed, all investment projects
succeed early (h = 1), while if the low signal is observed, only a fraction l < 1 of projects
succeed early. After observing early investment returns, intermediaries form beliefs over late
returns. Denote the probability that projects succeed late, conditional on the realization of
signal σ by pi(ω|σ). Then, pi(g|h) = 1 as all projects succeed in the good state, pi(r|l) = 0
since only l projects succeed in the recession state, and pi(b|l) = pi(b)−pi(r) = pi(b)− l > 0.10
9Formally, denote by φ(ω|σ) the probability that the state at t = 2 is ω conditional on the signal σ being
observed. Then, we assume φ(g|h) = 1, φ(g|l) = 0, φ(b|h) = 0, φ(b|l) = q, φ(r|h) = 0, φ(r|l) = 1− q. Also,
to ensure that signals convey the appropriate information, we require h > pi(b) and l ≤ pi(r). As a result,
φ(ω|σ) 6= φ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, σ ∈ Σ, and the signal is informative.
10Note that pi(g|l) = pi(b|h) = pi(r|l) = 0 as φ(g|l) = φ(b|h) = φ(r|h) = 0.
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Thus, we write gross returns as:
Eω (pi(ω))R0 = φ(g)pi(g|h)R0 + φ(b) [l + (1− l)pi(b|l)]R0 + φ(r) [l + (1− l)pi(r|l)]R0. (1)
We assume throughout that investment at t = 0 is worthwhile in the following sense.
ASSUMPTION 1. For any investment level I ≥ 0, Eω (pi(ω))R0I − c(I) > I.
Intermediaries also have access to new risky investment opportunities at t = 1, which
provide returns at t = 2. The gross return on one unit of investment is R1 in the case
of success and zero otherwise. The probability of success is qh when σ = h, and ql when
σ = l, where we qh > ql. This captures the intuitive case in which new opportunities are
of higher quality when the high signal is observed. For simplicity, the probability of success
is perfectly correlated across intermediaries, and independent of the aggregate state ω at
t = 2. These assumptions permits us to ignore the possibility of pooling t = 1 assets and
focus solely on the impact of securitizing t = 0 investments. As a further simplification, we
let the non-pecuniary costs associated with investment to be zero when σ = h. Finally, we
assume that t = 1 are always worthwhile:
ASSUMPTION 2. For any investment level I ≥ 0, qhR1I > qlR1I − c(I) > I.
Intermediaries’ Problem
At t = 0, each intermediary invests I0,j, and holds reserves y0,j, using capital wint and
funds raised from investors. To raise funds, intermediaries issue risk-less debt claims Dj at
t = 0, that promise a return ρ at t = 2. Additional funds for investment can be raised by
selling S0,j ≤ (1−a)I0,j of the cash-flows from the investment I0,j where a ∈ [0, 1) is the “skin-
in-the-game” required by originating intermediaries. The skin-in-the-game requirement is
exogenous in our model, but as discussed in Section 1, this can arise from informational
frictions in the securitization process and/or regulatory requirements.11 Intermediaries may
11DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) model a case where a skin-in-the-game requirement arises as part of the
optimal design of securities in order to mitigate informational frictions between issuers and outside buyers.
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also purchase cash flows T0,j from other intermediaries. We interpret T0,j as cash-flows
derived from a pool of all other intermediaries’ assets. Although an intermediary’s own
projects have the same expected payoffs as cash-flows purchased from the pool, due to
diversification the latter bear no idiosyncratic risk, only aggregate risk. This is important
because this diversification allows intermediaries to increase pledgable cash-flows to debt
holders when intermediaries have late returns.
The decisions of intermediaries at t = 1 consist of investing in new opportunities, pur-
chasing or selling securitized assets from other intermediaries, selling cash flows against their
own t = 0 investments that have not yet been realized, or holding cash. When σ = h, all in-
termediaries are identical as all t = 0 investments succeed and are realized early. As a result,
there is no motive for trade, and each intermediary makes I1,h,j new investments and holds
y1,h,j in cash. When, σ = l, early intermediaries have more funds available for investment,
and thus intermediaries with late returns may have access to relatively profitable investment
opportunities that cannot be exploited. We denote early types by e and late (not early)
types by ne. Early intermediaries invest an amount I1,e,j, while late intermediaries invest
I1,ne,j. Funds may be transferred between intermediaries through the exchange of securitized
assets or via the sale of remaining cash-flows on t = 0 investment. Importantly, we assume
that intermediaries have no other means to generate funds from outsiders. In particular, we
rule out lending across intermediaries at t = 1. This is done for ease of exposition, but could
be included in the analysis below without altering the qualitative results as long as there is
a limit on lending between intermediaries, which can be motivated in the same way as the
securitization frictions we model.
We denote early intermediaries’ period 1 purchases of securitized assets by T1,e,j. Late
intermediaries’ sales of securitized assets are −T1,ne,j, while sales of remaining cash-flows on
t = 0 assets are S1,ne,j. Cash holdings of early and late intermediaries are denoted y1,e,j
and y1,ne,j respectively. Formally, intermediary j chooses I0,j, S0,j, T0,j, Dj, y0,j, I1,h,j, I1,e,j,
See also Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), who provide a model in which skin-in-the-game is necessary to
discipline borrowers.
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I1,ne,j, T1,e,j, T1,ne,j, S1,ne,j, y1,h,j, y1,e,j, and y1,ne,j to maximize profits Πj at end of t = 2:
Πj = pΠh,j + (1− p) [lΠe,j + (1− l)Πne,j]− c(I0,j)− ρDj, (2)
where
Πh,j = qhR1I1,h,j + y1,h,j,
Πe,j = qlR1I1,e,j − c(I1,e,j) + y1,e,j + ql(pi(b)− l)R0((1− l)T0,j + T1,e,j),
Πne,j = qlR1I1,ne,j − c(I1,ne,j) + y1,ne,j + ql(pi(b)− l)R0(I0,j − S0,j + (1− l)T0,j + T1,ne,j − S1,ne,j)).
The first term in (2), Πh,j, is expected profit at period 2 following a high signal at t = 1.
In this case, all t = 0 projects succeed early and the proceeds are either re-invested in new
opportunities, with gross returns qhR1I1,h,j, or held as reserves, y1,h,j. We assume that are
there no additional costs associated with making new investments. Also, as intermediaries
are identical in this case, and each has sufficient funds to repay investors, there is no motive
for trade. The second term in (2) is expected profit at period 2 following a low signal at
t = 1. Expected profits are a weighted sum of early and late types’ profits, Πe,j and Πne,j
respectively. Profits for early types consist of returns on new investment, qlR1I1,e,j−c(I1,e,j),
reserves carried into period 2, y1,e,j, and late returns on securitized assets purchased either
at t = 0 or t = 1, ql(pi(b)− l)R0((1− l)T0,j + T1,e,j). Similarly, profits for late types consists
of investment returns, qlR1I1,ne,j − c(I1,ne,j), reserves y1,ne,j, and late returns on assets not
sold, ql(pi(b)− l)R0(I0,j − S0,j + (1− l)T0,j + T1,ne,j − S1,ne,j)). Finally, the last two terms in
(2) capture the costs of investment in the initial period, c(I0,j), and debt repayment, ρDj.
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Intermediaries maximize (2) subject to the following set of constraints:
(λ0,j) I0,j + p0(T0,j − S0,j) + y0,j ≤ wint +Dj, (3)
(µ0,j) S0,j ≤ (1− a)I0,j, (4)
(λ1,h,j) I1,h,j + y1,h,j ≤ R0(I0,j + T0,j − S0,j) + y0,j, (5)
(λ1,e,j) I1,e,j + p1T1,e,j + y1,e,j ≤ R0(I0,j − S0,j) + lR0T0,j + y0,j, (6)
(λ1,ne,j) I1,ne,j + p1(T1,ne,j − S1,ne,j) + y1,ne,j ≤ lR0T0,j + y0,j, (7)
(µ1,S,j) S0,j + S1,ne,j ≤ (1− a)I0,j, (8)
(µ1,T,j) 0 ≤ T1,ne,j + (1− l)T0,j, (9)
(η1,h,j) ρDj ≤ y1,h,j, (10)
(η1,e,j) ρDj ≤ y1,e,j, (11)
(η1,ne,j) ρDj ≤ y1,ne,j. (12)
Inequality (3) is the budget constraint at t = 0, which requires investment costs, net pur-
chases and reserves be no greater than equity and debt. The second constraint is the skin-
in-the-game requirement. Expression (5) is the budget constraint when σ = h. Inequalities
(6) and (7) are the budget constraints of the early and late intermediaries at t = 1 when
the low signal is realized. Early intermediaries have R0(I0,j − S0,j) more funds than late
types, as their projects succeed early. Early intermediaries can then use the returns from
their individual investments along with securitized assets to purchase assets from late ones
or invest in new opportunities and reserves. Late intermediaries use returns from securitized
assets, plus funds raised from asset sales, to finance new investment and reserves. Con-
straints (8) and (9) ensure that individual and securitized asset sales are feasible and satisfy
the skin-in-the-game requirement (T1,ne,j < 0 represent sales). The final set of constraints are
the intermediaries’ collateral constraints that ensure debt is always repaid.12 The solution
12We assume that intermediaries and investors can commit to long term contracts. Relaxing this as-
sumption in our environment has no effect on our results, however this represents an potentially interesting
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to this problem is characterized in Appendix A, where the Lagrange multipliers associated
with each constraint are given in brackets above.
2.2 Investors
There is a measure one of identical (infinitely) risk-averse investors, each endowed with
a large positive wealth wi. Investors value consumption only at t = 0 and t = 2 with
preferences given by
Ui = C0,i + βEω
[
min
ω
{C2,ω,i}
]
, (13)
where C0,i is consumption at t = 0, C2,ω,i is consumption at t = 2 in state ω, and β ∈ (0, 1)
is a discount factor. At t = 0, investors can either consume their wealth, purchase risk-less
debt from intermediaries that pays a gross interest rate ρ at t = 2, or buy risky assets
issued by intermediaries. At t = 1, investors can additionally purchase securities issued by
intermediaries. Investor i’s budget constraints at t = 0, 1, 2 are thus
C0,i +Di + p0T0,i + y0,i ≤ wi, (14)
p1T1,i + y1,i ≤ y0,i + lR0T0,i, (15)
C2,ω,i ≤ y1,i + ρDi + (1− l)ωR0T0,i + (pi(ω)− l)R0T1,i, (16)
where Di is the amount of risk-less debt purchased, y0,i and y1,i are the amounts of cash held
at t = 0, 1, and T0,i and T1,i are the quantities of intermediary assets purchased at t = 0, 1.
2.3 Equilibrium Definition
The intermediary problem is to choose investment, reserves, trade and debt levels to
maximize expected profits subject to budget, collateral, sales, and investors’ participation
extension in a model with more general investor preferences. For example, we could interpret our contracts
as short-term, which may be rolled over at t = 1. This is done in Stein (2012), although he ignores the
potential for renegotiation at time 1.
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t=0 t=1 t=2
p
1-p
1
q
1-q
g - "Good State"
b - "Bad State"
r - "Recession State"
Each FI j chooses: 
I0,j, S0,j, T0,j, y0,j, Dj
Signal is l (low),
only a fraction l
of assets pay
out early:
Early FIs choose: 
I1,e,j, T1,e,j, y1,e,j, 
Investor i chooses: 
C0,i, T0,i, Di, y0,i
Late FIs choose: 
I1,ne,j, S1,ne,j, 
T1,ne,j, y1,ne,j
 
Signal is h (high), 
all assets pay
out early:
All FIs choose 
I1,h,j, y1,h,j 
Aggregate state, and 
payoffs on all late
assets and the t=1
investments are 
realized.
Debt is repaid,
investors consume, 
intermediary profits
are determined.
 
Figure 1: Timing.
constraints. The investor problem is to choose how much debt and securities issued by
intermediaries to purchase (if any), and savings to maximize expected utility of consumption
subject to budget constraints. The price of debt, ρ, and the prices of securities p0, p1, are
taken as given by intermediaries and investors. We define a competitive equilibrium as
follows:
DEFINITION 1. A symmetric competitive equilibrium consists of prices ρ, p0, p1, and
choices of investment I0,j, I1,h,j, I1,e,j, I1,ne,j, reserves y0,j, y1,h,y1,e, y1,ne, trade T0,j, S0,j,
T1,ne, S1,ne, and debt Dj by each intermediary j, and choices of debt Di, securities purchases
T0,i, T1,i, and savings y0,i, y1,i for each investor i, such that given prices:
12
1. Investors maximize expected utility (13) s.t. (14)-(16),
2. Intermediaries maximize expected profits (2) s.t. (3)-(12),
3. Markets clear:
Market for debt at t = 0 :
∫
Didi =
∫
Djdj, (17)
Market for assets at t = 0 :
∫
T0,jdj +
∫
T0,idi =
∫
S0,jdj, (18)
Market for assets at t = 1 :
∫
{e}
T1,e,jdj +
∫
T1,idi =
∫
{ne}
S1,ne,jdj, (19)
where {e} and {ne} are the set of early and late types.
3 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the competitive market equilibrium. We first solve for the
optimal decisions of investors and intermediaries given asset prices p0, p1, and the interest rate
on debt ρ. Aggregating these decisions, we show how market clearing determines equilibrium
prices. In equilibrium, investors abstain from participating in asset markets, and lend to
intermediaries only if the interest rate is sufficiently high. The decisions of intermediaries
are closely linked to the value of investment opportunities at period 1. When the value
of these is low, securitization does not alter leverage, and fire-sales do not affect period 1
investment levels. On the other hand, when the value of new investment opportunities is
relatively high, late intermediaries can be constrained in equilibrium. That is, they may
be forced to forgo profitable investments if they can not raise sufficient funds. In this case,
securitization is valuable and enhances leverage as it leads to an implicit transfer from early
to late types. Throughout, we denote equilibrium values with an asterisk.
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3.1 Optimal Decisions of Investors
Investor behavior is straightforward in that they either consume their endowments, or
purchase risk-less debt. We assume they prefer to lend rather than consume when indifferent.
LEMMA 1. T ∗0,i = y
∗
0,i = T
∗
1,i = y
∗
1,i = 0, and Di = wi if ρ ≥ β−1 and 0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Investors only value assets at the lowest realization and thus are priced out of the market
for assets by intermediaries. Moreover, investor preferences ensure that all debt is risk-free
and hence their break-even condition on funds lent to intermediaries, r ≥ β−1, places a lower
bound on the equilibrium interest rate.
3.2 Optimal Decisions of Intermediaries
The following assumption ensures that intermediaries borrow a positive amount, so that
taking on debt to expand investment is worthwhile. The implications of this are characterized
formally in Lemma 2, which states that they hold no reserves at t = 0, and hold exactly the
quantity of reserves at t = 1 as needed to service debt at t = 2.
ASSUMPTION 3. Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint) > β−1 > Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint + wi).
LEMMA 2. Demand for debt is downward sloping, ∂Dj/∂ρ < 0, D
∗
j > 0 only if ρ ≤
Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint), y∗0,j = 0, y∗1,h,j = y∗1,e,j = y∗1,ne,j = ρD∗j .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Demand for debt is downward sloping due to the diminishing returns on investment at t = 0.
Given that intermediaries have a strictly positive amount of equity, a sufficiently small level
of debt can always be repaid so that Dj > 0 in equilibrium. This requires the interest rate be
below the marginal return on the first unit of debt, or Eω (pi(ω))R0−c′(wint). Moreover, it is
never optimal for intermediaries to finance reserve holdings at t = 0 via debt. This is because
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for every unit of debt raised at t = 0, intermediaries must generate ρ− 1 ≥ β−1 − 1 > 0 at
t = 1 to service this additional unit of debt. To understand reserve holdings at period 1, note
that neither returns from new investments at t = 1 nor late returns on t = 0 can be pledged
to repay investors at t = 2. This is because infinitely risk-averse investors value these pledges
at the lowest possible return which is zero. Hence, intermediaries hold reserves equal to ρDj
for all σ ∈ Σ. Note that intermediaries always have sufficient funds to build up the required
reserves, otherwise no funds would be lent in equilibrium given investor preferences.
We now focus on the optimal investment and trading decisions of intermediaries at period
1, taking as given period 0 decisions. When σ = h, intermediaries are identical at t = 1 as
all t = 0 investments succeed early, and hence there is no trade. In this case, intermediaries
simply set aside the required reserves and invest the remainder in new opportunities since
these are always worthwhile, from Assumption 2. Hence, I1,h,j = R0I0,j − ρDj. When σ = l,
intermediaries differ at period 1. A fraction l receive the full return on the fraction of t = 0
investments that were not securitized. The remaining fraction (1 − l) do not receive any
early returns on their own investments. Due to securitization, all intermediaries also receive
a fraction of the early returns from other intermediaries’ projects. For a given p1, early
types can use their funds to either invest in new opportunities or purchase assets from late
types. The amount of new investment, I1,e,j, equates the marginal return to investment with
the marginal return on purchasing assets. The former is simply qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j) while the
latter is ql(pi(b)− l)R0/p1 where ql(pi(b)− l)R0 is the net present value on t = 0 investments,
conditional on the low signal at t = 1.
LEMMA 3. Demand for assets is downward sloping, ∂T1,e,j/∂p1 < 0. Let p1 = (pi(b) −
l)R0/R1, early types t = 1 investment and asset purchases, I1,e,j and T1,e,j, are characterized
by
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• For p1 < p1,
I1,e,j = 0
T1,e,j =
aR0I0,j + lR0T0,j − ρDj
p1
.
• For p1 ≥ p1,
qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j) = ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
⇒ ∂I1,e,j
∂p1
> 0,
T1,e,j =
aR0I0,j + lR0T0,j − ρDj − I1,e,j
p1
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As the price p1 increases, the return on purchasing assets is lower and therefore more invest-
ment is undertaken and fewer assets are purchased by early types. Analogously, for lower
values of p1, early types purchase more assets, and invest less.
The investment and sales decisions by late types involve a similar trade-off. By selling
t = 0 assets late types forgo the returns, but can increase new investment and/or generate
reserves required to service debt. Sales consist of securitized assets on hand, −T1,ne,j as well
as any of their own investments which were not sold at t = 0, S1,ne. Late types may be
constrained if they run out of t = 0 assets to sell, in which case the multiplier on the sales
constraint will bind and µ1,T,j > 0.
LEMMA 4. Let p1 = (pi(b) − l)R0/R1, late types t = 1 investment and asset purchases,
I1,ne,j, and S1,ne,j − T1,ne,j are characterized by:
• For p1 < p1,
I1,ne,j = 0
S1,ne,j − T1,ne,j = ρDj − lR0T0,j − y0,j
p1
.
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• For p1 ≥ p1,
qlR1 − c′(I1,ne,j) = ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
+
µ1,T,j
(1− p)(1− l) ,
S1,ne,j − T1,ne,j = min
[
I1,ne,j + ρDj − lR0T0,j
p1
, (1− l)T0,j + (1− a)I0,j − S0,j
]
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As can be seen from Lemmas 3 and 4, if late types are constrained, equilibrium investment
levels will differ across types at t = 1. As a result, when late type are constrained at t = 1,
intermediaries always find it optimal to securitize as much as possible at t = 0. This is
formalized in the following result.
LEMMA 5. µ1,T,j > 0 ⇐⇒ I∗1,e,j > I∗1,ne,j ⇐⇒ µ0,j > 0 and µ1,S,j = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The key friction built in to our framework is that late intermediaries may only trade assets
at t = 1 to generate funds for investment. If late intermediaries cannot raise sufficient
funds, I∗1,e,j > I
∗
1,ne,j. Furthermore, when µ1,T,j > 0, securitized assets are worth more than
individual investment holdings, since they provide relatively more resources to late types
who value them more. As result, being constrained at t = 1 means that intermediaries
will securitize to the extent possible at t = 0, so that µ0,j > 0. For simplicity, we shall
assume throughout that intermediaries always securitize t = 0 assets to the extent possible,
regardless of the value of µ1,T,j. Hence, S
∗
0,j = T
∗
0,j = (1 − a)I∗0,j.13 We now consider the
investment decision at period 0.
13Lemma 5 shows that this is consistent with optimal behavior when constrained. However, this is some-
what arbitrary for the unconstrained case, since the optimal choices of S0,j and T0,j are not well defined in
this case. This is not significant for our results however, since our focus is on equilibria in which intermediaries
are constrained (the reasons for which are made clear in Section 4).
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LEMMA 6. I∗0,j is characterized by
p(R0 − ρ)(qhR1 − 1) + (1− p)l((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − ρ)(qlR1 − 1− c′(I1,e))
+ (1− p)(1− l)((1− a)lR0 − ρ)(qlR1 − 1− c′(I1,ne)) + µ1,T,j(1− a)(1− l)
+ Eω(pi(ω))R0 − ρ = c′(I∗0,j). (20)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The marginal return to a unit of investment at t = 0, given that D∗j > 0 is Eω(pi(ω))R0 − ρ
plus the marginal returns from reinvesting the early proceeds at t = 1. When the signal is
high, each additional unit of I0,j generates R0 − ρ units of resources at t = 1 that can be
reinvested for a gross expected return qhR1. Similarly, when the signal is low, another unit of
I0,j generates (a+(1−a)l)R0−ρ units of resources for the early types and (1−a)lR0−ρ units
of resources for the late types. These can be reinvested at gross returns of qlR1− c′(I1,e) and
qlR1− c′(I1,ne). If the sales constraint binds, increasing I0,j provides an additional benefit: it
raises by (1− a)(1− l) units the quantity of assets late types can sell. The optimal choice of
I0,j then equates the marginal benefit of investment with the corresponding marginal cost,
c′(I0,j).14
3.3 Market Clearing
From the optimal choices of investors and intermediaries, we can infer that in ρ must
satisfy the following bounds Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint) ≥ ρ ≥ β−1. In fact, given that demand
for debt is downward sloping (Lemma 1), and supply is perfectly elastic for prices above
β−1 (Lemma 2), together with Assumption 3 requires that in equilibrium ρ = β−1. This is
illustrated this graphically in Figure 2.
14If intermediaries incur losses at t = 1, these will be borne by their equity. As a result, this may place
an upper bound on the level of initial investment. However, we assume that the marginal costs associated
with investment at t = 0 are sufficiently high so that (20) always holds. A sufficient condition for an interior
solution for I0,j is p(R0 − ρ)(qhR1 − 1) + (1− p)(lR0 − ρ)(qlR1 − 1) + Eω (pi(ω))R0 − ρ < c′
(
−ρwint
lR0−β−1
)
.
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Figure 2: Market for debt.
Consider the t = 0 market for securitized assets. It is shown in Lemma 5 that when
constrained, S0,j = T0,j = (1 − a)I0,j. When unconstrained, intermediaries are indifferent
over their choices of T0,j and S0,j, so we simply assume they securitize all assets. Regardless
of the choices of T0,j and S0,j, any candidate equilibrium price p˜0 must clear the market, and
thus S0,j(p˜0)−T0,j(p˜0) = 0. Inspecting the intermediaries’ problem, it is clear that p˜0 has no
effect on the budget, since all agents are identical and net purchases are zero. Thus optimal
choices are determined by the first order conditions from the intermediaries’ problem at a
given p1, which are provided in Appendix A. The t = 0 price that clears the market satisfies
p0 =
aµ0,j + c
′ (I∗0,j)
λ0,j
+ 1. (21)
In an unconstrained equilibrium, p0 = c
′ (I∗0,j) /λ0,j + 1 is simply the marginal cost of time
0 investment. When constrained, p0 is strictly larger than the unconstrained case, which
reflects the fact that securitized assets are relatively valuable in this type of equilibrium as
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they provide more resources to late types in the low state of the world.
We now consider the determination of p1. Investment and securitization at t = 0 influence
p1 and late types may or may not constrained, illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. From the
optimal choices of intermediaries described in Lemmas 3 and 4, we can infer the following
bounds on p1: ql(pi(b)− l)R0 ≥ p1 ≥ ql(pi(b)− l)R0/qlR1 when t = 1 investment is positive.
To understand these bounds, note that if p1 were to exceed the conditional return on assets,
early types would not be willing to purchase them, since they can always invest in new
projects that earn positive profit. Thus, at the equilibrium, assets will only trade at fire-sale
prices (i.e. below NPV). Similarly, if p1 is below ql(pi(b)− l)R0/qlR1, early types do not make
any new investments as buying up cheap assets is more profitable. The following proposition
ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium.
Demand for Assets
0q(π(b)-l)R
p1
Supply of Assets
-(1-l)T1,ne
q
1,elT
p
1
(1-l)(1-a)I0
Figure 3: Unconstrained equilibrium.
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q(π(b)-l)R
p1
0
q
Demand for Assets
lT1,e
Supply of Assets
-(1-l)T1,ne
p
1
(1-l)(1-a)I0
Figure 4: Constrained equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1. There exists a unique symmetric competitive equilibrium with positive
investment at both periods.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To more fully characterize the nature of the equilibrium we need to further characterize
the supply curve at t = 1, which depends on the relative strength of two motives. The
collateral motive, which pushes the supply curve to be negatively sloped. There is also
the investment motive, which pushes the supply curve to be positively sloped. When the
collateral motive dominates, the supply curve is downward sloping. When the investment
motive is sufficiently strong, the supply curve is upward sloping above p1 > (pi(b)− l)R0/R1.
Sufficient conditions for this case to obtain are as follows.
ASSUMPTION 4.
21
I. c
′′′
> 0, and c′′(wi(lR0 − β−1) + wintlR0) ≥ 1ql(pi(b)−l)R0(1−a)(wi+wint) , or
II. c
′′′
< 0 and 1
c′′(0) ≥ ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− a)(1− l)(w + wint).
LEMMA 7. Given Assumption 4, the supply curve is upward sloping for p1 ≥ p1. In
addition, if ql(pi(b)− l) ≤ al(1−a)(1−l) , then late intermediaries are constrained in equilibrium:
µ1,T,j > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We focus below on equilibria in which µ1,T,j > 0. Assumption 4 ensures that the supply
curve at t = 1 is upward sloping, which is required for constrained equilibria. Lemma 7
ensures that parameters exist which support this type of situation.
4 Welfare
This section focuses on the efficiency of allocations at the competitive equilibrium. We
begin by characterizing the first-best allocation and then consider the implications of market
incompleteness and securitization.
4.1 First-Best
In the market equilibrium, investor utility is simply w, since ρ = 1/β. It is sufficient
for our purposes to focus on the point of the first-best frontier associated with this level of
investor utility. Thus, we consider a social planner that collectively maximizes intermediary
returns, subject to ρ = 1/β. Decisions are made ex-ante and all intermediaries are equivalent
from a welfare perspective, thus we ignore subscripts and allow the planner to directly choose
the aggregate quantities I0, D, y0, I1,h, I1,e, I1,ne, y1,h, y1,l to maximize:
ΠP = p [qhR1I1,h + y1,h]+(1−p) [l(qlR1I1,e − c(I1,e)) + (1− l)(qlR1I1,ne − c(I1,ne)) + y1,l]−c(I0)−ρD,
(22)
22
subject to the following budget and collateral constraints:
(λ0) I0 + y0 ≤ wint +D, (23)
(λ1,h) I1,h + y1,h ≤ R0I0 + y0, (24)
(λ1,l) lI1,e + (1− l)I1,ne + y1,l,≤ lR0I0 + y0, (25)
(η1,h) ρD ≤ y1,h, (26)
(η1,l) ρD ≤ y1,l. (27)
We refer to the solution of this problem as the first-best. The planner maximizes all inter-
mediary profits simultaneously subject to a single budget constraint in each state. As shown
in proof of Proposition 2, the first-best requires equal investments for early and late inter-
mediary types at t = 1, which is not necessarily the case in the private market equilibrium.
When markets are incomplete, this can result in an inefficiency that does not occur when
markets are complete, as outlined in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. (Complete markets) When intermediaries have access at t = 0 to a
complete set of one-period securities that are contingent on the signal, as well as individual
type at t = 1, the competitive equilibrium allocation is first-best.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Securitized assets are unnecessary when intermediaries can trade one-period contingent
securities at time 0. When markets are not complete, i.e., individual type is not contractible,
trading in securitized assets at t = 0 may be useful since this can move resources at t = 1
from intermediaries whose assets have paid out to those whose have not. This is especially
valuable when intermediaries face binding constraints at time 1, since those whose assets
have not paid out at t = 1 place higher value on cash. The following result shows that when
there are no frictions in the process, securitization completes markets in this environment.
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PROPOSITION 3. When there are no contingent securities at t = 0, but securitization is
frictionless, so that a = 0, the private market equilibrium allocation is first-best.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When there are no frictions in the securitization process, contingent securities are not
necessary to achieve the first-best. This is because intermediaries that are constrained at
t = 1 find it worthwhile to securitize their assets at t = 0. When a = 0, this means
that the constrained equilibrium is ruled out since all assets are securitized and there is no
heterogeneity (and thus no trade) ex-post.15 It is important to stress at this point that we
rule out borrowing between intermediaries at t = 1. If there were frictionless borrowing at
t = 1, then this also delivers the first-best without the need for securitization or contingent
contracts.
4.2 Second-Best and Inefficient Investment
We now consider the case where markets are incomplete and there are frictions associated
with the securitization process. When a > 0 and there are no alternative funds available at
t = 1, late intermediaries must secure funding through asset sales on the spot market. In
this case, there is trade at t = 1 and atomistic intermediaries fail to endogeneize the price
effects of their time 0 decisions. This can result in constrained inefficiency, in the sense that
a planner can engineer Pareto improvements even when subject to the same restrictions as
the private economy, unlike the Planner described in Section 4.1.
To show that the competitive equilibrium can be constrained inefficient, consider a per-
turbation of aggregate investment dI0 =
∫
j
dI0,j, such that dI0,j is equal for all j. The effect
15While we assume T0,j = S0,j = (1 − a)I0,j , intermediaries may not securitize all assets if they do not
anticipate being constrained, and in this case there may be differences across types at t = 1. However,
we show below that this is not inefficient since this results only in cash transfers across risk-neutral parties
and does not affect aggregate investment. Note that if intermediaries were risk-averse, they would always
securitize the full amount since this has insurance value which is irrelevant in our setting.
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of this perturbation on intermediary j’s profits at the competitive equilibrium is:
dpi∗j
dI0
= λ1,e,j
(
−dp1
dI0
T ∗1,e,j
)
+ λ1,ne,j
(
−dp1
dI0
(T ∗1,ne,j − S∗1,ne,j)
)
. (28)
The direct impacts of the change are zero at the equilibrium allocation, which satisfies the
individual first-order conditions. What remains are the price effects that arise from a change
in aggregate investment, something not considered by individual decision makers. Note that
such a perturbation generally affects both prices p0 and p1, however changes in p0 have no
impact on time 0 intermediaries at the equilibrium, since each has net securitized assets
purchases of zero. Importantly, if dpi∗j/dI0 6= 0, the equilibrium is constrained inefficient.
To see this, consider a constrained planning problem in which the planner is forced to
make use of the same instruments as private intermediaries. Thus, the planner solves the
private intermediary problem, except that a planner considers the implications of aggregate
investment and thus endongeneizes the price effects described in (28). Therefore, (28) is
precisely the difference between the individuals’ first order condition on t = 0 investment
and second-best planner’s problem. The following proposition summarizes the inefficiency.
PROPOSITION 4. (Inefficiency) When a > 0, the competitive market equilibrium is
constrained inefficient whenever µ1,T,j > 0. Parameters exist which support either over or
under investment.
• lR0 − 1β > 0 is sufficient for under-investment.
• 1
β
− lR0 > a(1− l)R0 is sufficient for over-investment.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When unconstrained, the marginal return to t = 1 investment is equalized across in-
termediaries and thus t = 0 decisions reflect the full social cost and benefit of investment.
When constrained, the price impacts of individual decisions result in inefficient investment.
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More specifically, individual intermediaries do not internalize the impacts of I0,j on aggre-
gate cash in the market and thus prices, which they take as given. When lR0 − 1/β > 0,
t = 0 investment generates additional aggregate cash in the market at t = 1, which results
in a higher asset price and welfare improvements. If lR0− 1/β is sufficiently negative on the
other hand, this is has the opposite effect and results in over-invesment.
4.3 Policy and over-investment
We now consider the use of two real-world regulatory instruments that are relevant to the
inefficiency in our model. In this section we focus solely on the over-investment case. The
following corollary of Proposition 4 considers the direct impact of restricting investment.
COROLLARY 1. Restrictions on leverage increase welfare when the competitive equilib-
rium is characterized by over-investment.
A reduction in leverage in our framework is equivalent to a reduction in initial investment
and the result is obtained directly from Proposition 4. This increases welfare due to the
increase in p1, which effectively transfers resources from early to late types. While this is the
most direct approach, this policy requires that a regulator have the information and power
to impose such a restriction. An alternative possibility, is to reduce the collateral value of
investment by further tightening the skin-in-the-game constraint. In our model, this can be
analyzed with the following comparative static result.
PROPOSITION 5. (Skin-in-the-game) In the over-investment case, dΠ∗j/da < 0 at the
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Consider,
dpi∗j
da
= −µ0,jI∗0,j −
dp1
da
[
λ∗1,e,jT
∗
1,e,j + λ
∗
1,ne,jT
∗
1,ne,j
]
. (29)
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First note that this derivative is zero in the unconstrained case. This is because production
at early and late types is identical when unconstrained, and a change in a amounts to a
redistribution of cash between risk-neutral individuals in period 1. When constrained, the
first term in the expression above is the direct effect, which is always negative and captures
the fact that increasing skin-in-the-game requirements leads to lower investment at t = 0 as
it restricts the ability of intermediaries to generate collateral. The second term is the indirect
effect, which captures the change in the equilibrium price due to changes in a through the
effect on aggregate investment at t = 0. Increasing a will tend to reduce investment at
t = 0 which will reduce the severity of the fire-sales at t = 1. As a result, the price of
assets at t = 1 are pushed up. If the price effect dominates the direct effect, it seems
plausible that a regulator could achieve a Pareto improvement by tightening the skin-in-the-
game requirements. The proof of Proposition 5 shows that the price effect is never sufficient
to offset the direct reduction in welfare from the restriction. The reason for this is that a
price increase raises collateral value and thus investment, defeating the purpose of the policy.
Thus, while securitization leads to more investment/leverage, which is already excessive from
a second-best perspective, this is always welfare improving. An increase in a is illustrated
in Figure 5.
5 Conclusion
In the absence of market frictions, securitization provides valuable risk-sharing in the
financial sector when there are incomplete markets. When intermediaries are forced to hold
some of the idiosyncratic risk associated with their investments (i.e., skin-in-the-game) how-
ever, a pecuniary externality can generate inefficient investment ex-ante and excessive fire-
sales ex-post. Over-investment can be reduced by simple restrictions on leverage. However,
reducing leverage indirectly by tightening skin-in-the-game is never welfare improving.
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Figure 5: Impact on t = 1 equilibrium of increasing extent of securitization.
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A Intermediary Problem
Re-write the intermediaries’ objective as follows:
Πj = p [qhR1I1,h,j + y1,h,j]+(1−p) [l(qlR1I1,e,j − c(I1,e,j) + y1,e,j) + (1− l)(qlR1I1,ne,j − c(I1,ne,j) + y1,ne,j)
+ql(pi(b)− l)R0((1− l)(I0,j − S0,j + T0,j) + lT1,e,j + (1− l)(T1,ne,j − S1,ne,j))]−c(I0,j)−ρDj.
Necessary conditions for an optimum are:
I0,j :(1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− l)− λ0,j − c′(I0,j) + λ1,h,jR0 + (µ0,j + µ1,S,j)(1− a) + λ1,e,jR0 ≤ 0
(30)
T0,j :(1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− l)− λ0,jp0 + λ1,h,jR0 + (λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j)lR0 + µ1,T,j(1− l) ≤ 0
(31)
S0,j :− (1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− l) + λ0,jp0 − λ1,h,jR0 − µ0,j − λ1,e,jR0 − µ1,S,j ≤ 0 (32)
Dj :− ρ+ λ0,j − ρη1,h,j − ρη1,e,j − ρη1,ne,j ≤ 0 (33)
I1,h,j :pqhR1 − λ1,h,j ≤ 0 (34)
I1,e,j :(1− p)lqlR1 − λ1,e,j − (1− p)lc′(I1,e,j) ≤ 0 (35)
T1,e,j :(1− p)lql(pi(b)− l)R0 − λ1,e,jp1 ≤ 0 (36)
I1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)qlR1 − λ1,ne,j − (1− p)(1− l)c′(I1,ne,j) ≤ 0 (37)
T1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0 − λ1,ne,jp1 + µ1,T,j = 0 (38)
S1,ne,j :− (1− p)(1− l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0 + λ1,ne,jp1 − µ1,S,j ≤ 0 (39)
y0,j :− λ0,j + λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j ≤ 0 (40)
y1,h,j :p− λ1,h,j + η1,h,j = 0 (41)
y1,e,j :(1− p)l − λ1,e,j + η1,e,j = 0 (42)
y1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)− λ1,ne,j + η1,ne,j = 0 (43)
It is straightforward to show that all budget and collateral constraints bind:
λ0,j, λ1,h,j, λ1,e,j, λ1,ne,j, η1,h,j, η1,e,j, η1,ne,j > 0.
It is shown in Lemma 5 that when constrained, S0,j = T0,j = (1 − a)I0,j. When uncon-
strained, intermediaries are indifferent over their choices of T0,j and S0,j, so as discussed in
the paper, we simply assume they prefer to securitize all assets. To characterize the so-
lution, we impose this and recast the intermediary problem accordingly. Focusing on the
constrained equilibrium, in which sales constraints bind, we use the constraints to rewrite
the choice variables in terms of I∗0,j, and I
∗
1,e,j.
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Constrained Solution (µ1,T > 0):
y∗0,j = 0,
D∗j = I
∗
0,j − wint,
I∗1,h,j = R0I
∗
0,j − ρD∗j ,
= (R0 − ρ) I∗0,j + ρwint,
y∗1,e,j = y
∗
1,ne,j = y
∗
1,h,j = ρD
∗
j ,
T ∗1,e,j =
(aR0 + (1− a)lR0)I∗0,j − ρDj − I∗1,e,j
p1
,
=
(
aR0 + (1− a)lR0 − ρ
p1
)
I∗0,j −
(
1
p1
)
I∗1,e,j +
(
1
p1
)
ρwint,
T ∗1,ne,j = −(1− l)(1− a)I∗0,j,
I∗1,ne,j = ((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)I∗0,j + ρwint,
The multipliers are determined by the first order conditions as follows:
λ1,h,j = pqhR1,
λ1,e,j = (1− p)l(qlR1 − c′(I∗1,e,j)) =
(1− p)lql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
,
λ1,ne,j = (1− p)(1− l)(qlR1 − c′(I∗1,ne,j)),
λ0,j = ρ(λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j),
η1,h,j = λ1,h,j − p,
η1,e,j = λ1,e,j − (1− p)l,
η1,ne,j = λ1,ne,j − (1− p)(1− l),
µ1,T,j = λ1,ne,jp1 − (1− p)(1− l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0,
= p1
[
λ1,ne,j − (1− l)
l
λ1,e,j
]
.
Substituting the expressions above into the first order conditions on I0,j and I1,e,j and
manipulating, we obtain the following three equations that characterize I∗0,j, and I
∗
1,e,j, and
I∗1,ne,j:
(R0 − ρ)λ1,h,j + (aR0 + (1− a)lR0 − ρ)λ1,e,j + (1− p)(1− l)(a+ (1− a)l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0
+(1− p)(1− l)(qlR1 − c′(I1,ne))((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ) = c′(I∗0,j), (44)
qlR1 − ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
= c′(I∗1,e,j), (45)
((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)I∗0,j + ρwint = I∗1,ne,j. (46)
The intermediaries’ problem has a unique solution when the corresponding second-order
conditions hold. As the objective is separable in I∗0,j and I
∗
1,e,j, it suffices to show that
∂2pij
∂I20,j
< 0,
∂2pij
∂I21,e,j
< 0, which is true from the assumption that c′′(·) > 0.
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The t = 0, 1 market-clearing conditions written in terms of investments are:
I∗1,ne,j(p0, p1) = ((lR0 + (1− l)p1)(1− a)− ρ) I∗0,j(p0, p1) + ρwint, (47)
I∗1,e,j(p0, p1) =
(
R0(l + a(1− l))− (1− l)
2
l
(1− a)p1 − ρ
)
I∗0,j(p0, p1) + ρwint. (48)
These conditions have been simplified to show that prices are such that both late and early
types invest available funds at time 1. Available funds for early (late) types is cash from
time 0 investments, net of purchases (sales) and required collateral, ρ(I∗0,j − wint).
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. At t = 0, investors value securitized assets at pi(r)R0 = lR0. Using (30) and (32),
intermediaries value the asset at p0 ≥ 1 + c
′(I0,j)
λ0,j
> 1. Hence, we have lR0/p0 < 1 < 1/β ≤ ρ
where the first inequality follows from lR0 < 1. Thus, debt dominates holding cash, which
in turn dominate the securitized asset. Since there is no securitization at t = 1, investors
clearly do not purchase assets since they place a value of 0 on them.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Using D∗j = I
∗
0,j − wint from the solution to the intermediaries’ problem we have
∂D∗j
∂ρ
=
∂I∗0,j
∂ρ
= −λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j
c′′(I∗0,j)
< 0, (49)
using (44) when intermediaries are unconstrained. In the constrained case, we have
∂I∗0,j
∂ρ
= −λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j + (1− p)(1− l)
[
c
′′
(I∗1,ne,j)I
′
1,ne,j((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)
]
c′′(I∗0,j)
,
= −λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j − (1− p)(1− l)
[
c
′′
(I∗1,ne,j)D
∗
j ((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)
]
c′′(I∗0,j) + c
′′(I∗1,ne,j)(1− p)(1− l)((1− a)(lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)2
,
where we have used (46) to obtain I ′1,ne,j = ((1− a)(lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)I ′0,j − (I0,j − wint).
Then,
∂I∗0,j
∂ρ
< 0 when
(1− a)(lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ < λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j
(1− p)(1− l)c′′(I∗1,ne,j)(I∗0,j − wint)
. (50)
A sufficient condition for this is:
(1− a)(l + (1− l)ql(pi(b)− l))R0 − ρ < pqhR1
(1− p)(1− l)wic′′((lR0 − ρ)wi + lR0wint) . (51)
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lR0 − ρ < pqhR1 + (1− p)
(1− p)(1− l)wic′′((lR0 − r)wi + lR0wint) .
In the constrained case, an increase in ρ not only reduces generally the available resources at
t = 1, it also changes the value of resources for late types. When (1− a)(l+ (1− l)ql(pi(b)−
l))R0 − ρ > 0, this value may in fact increase with ρ. When the above condition holds, it
ensures that this increase is dominated by the general decline resources. Hence, when this
condition holds, demand for debt is always downward sloping.
To see that D∗j > 0 when ρ ≤ Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint), first note that I∗0,j = D∗j + wint.
Then, using (30), and noting that λ1,h,j = pqR1 > p, λ1,ne,j ≥ (1− p)(1− l), λ1,e,j ≥ (1− p)l,
and µ1,T,j ≥ 0, the marginal benefit of the first unit of debt is at least
p(R0 − ρ) + (1− p)l((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − ρ) + (1− p)(1− l)((1− a)lR0 − ρ)
+ (1− p)(1− l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0 − c′(wint) (52)
= Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint)− ρ ≥ 0, (53)
when ρ ≤ Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint). Thus, D∗j > 0 and I∗0,j > wint.
To prove the second part of the Lemma, combine (33) with (41)-(43) to obtain λ0,j ≤
ρ(λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j). Then, using this in (40), the marginal benefit to holding reserves
is (−ρ+ 1)(λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j) < 0 as ρ ≥ β−1 > 1.
To prove the next part of the Lemma, use (34) and (41) to obtain: η1,h,j = λ1,h,j − p ≥
pqhRh − p > 0, (35) and (42) to obtain η1,e,j ≥ (1 − p)l (qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j)) > 0, and (37) and
(43) to get η1,ne,j ≥ (1 − p)(1 − l) (qlR1 − c′(I1,ne,j)) > 0, where all three strict inequalities
follow from Assumption 2.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. When p1 < p1, returns on purchasing assets strictly dominate investing, hence I
∗
1,e,j =
0, and T ∗1,e,j =
aR0I0,j+lR0T0,j−ρDj
p1
via the budget constraint (3). When, p1 ≥ p1, combining
(35) and (36), we obtain the desired characterization for I∗1,e,j, and T
∗
1,e,j follows from (6).
Furthermore,
I ′1,e,j =
q(pi(b)− l)R0
c′′(I∗0,j)p
2
1
> 0. (54)
Thus,
∂T ∗1,e,j
∂p1
=
−I ′1,e,jp1 − (aR0I0,j + lR0T0,j − rDj − I∗1,e,j)
p1
< 0, (55)
from the budget constraint.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The proof is analogous to those in Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 5
35
Proof. Equations (35) and (36) yield
c′(I1,e) = ql
(
R1 − (pi(b)− l)R0
p1
)
. (56)
Similarly, using (37) and (38) we have
c′(I1,ne) = ql
(
R1 − (pi(b)− l)R0 + µ1,T,j
p1
)
. (57)
Hence, µ1,T,j = 0 ⇔ I1,e,j = I1,ne,j. Moreover, when µ1,T,j > 0, c′(I1,ne,j) < c′(I1,e,j) =⇒
I1,e,j > I1,ne,j as c(·) is convex. Adding (31), and (32), we obtain lR0λ1,ne,j− (1− l)R0λ1,e,j +
(1− l)µ1,T,j ≤ µ0,j +µ1,S,j. Substituting expressions for λ1,e,j, and λ1,ne,j from the first order
conditions we can simplify as follows:
µ1,T,j
(
l
R0
p1
+ (1− l)
)
= µ0,j + µ1,S,j. (58)
Since the bracketed term in (58) is strictly positive, µ1,T,j > 0 ⇔ µ0,j + µ1,S,j > 0. Finally,
to show that µ0,j > 0, and µ1,S,j = 0, we add (30), and (32), to obtain [λ0,j(p0 − 1) −
c′(I0,j)]/a = µ0,j + µ1,S,j, when investment and sales are non-negative. This implies that
p0 > 1 + c
′(I0,j)/λ0,j > 1. Hence, it is profitable to invest and then sell assets at t = 0. As a
result, µ0,j > 0, and therefore µ1,S,j = 0 since there are no assets to sell at period 1.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. The condition characterizing I∗0,j is derived formally in Appendix A (see (44)). Noting
that S∗0,j = T
∗
0,j, the expression for D
∗
0,j follows from the period 0 budget constraint (3).
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. It suffices to show there is a unique p1 that clears the asset market at t = 1. We focus
on prices that satisfy p1 > p1 = ql(pi(b) − l)R0/qlR1, otherwise neither early or late types
invest at t = 1. In an equilibrium with no investment at t = 1, excess demand is
1
p1
(lR0I0,j − ρDj), (59)
where the bracketed term is aggregate resources net of debt obligations at t = 1. Thus, inter-
mediaries invest exactly that amount which allows them to satisfy their debt requirements.
This type of equilibrium will arise when investments at t = 0 are sufficiently more profitable
than those at t = 1. With no investment at t = 1 there is no inefficiency in our model and
thus we ignore these cases.
First, consider constrained equilibria at t = 1. As shown in Lemma 3, demand for assets
at t = 1 is monotone decreasing. For a given I0,j, which is always positive, the quantity traded
is (1 − a)(1 − l)I0,j and the unique price is simply determined by demand as characterized
in Section A. We provide a condition on model primitives in Lemma 7 that is sufficient to
ensure the existence of such a (unique) constrained equilibrium.
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If the equilibrium is unconstrained, excess demand at t = 1 is given by
lR0I0,j − ρDj − I1
p1
, (60)
where I1 = I1,e,j = I1,ne,j, since investments are equalized in the unconstrained case. Differ-
entiating (60) with respect to p1 gives
− I
′
1
p1
−
(
lR0I0,j − ρDj − I1
p21
)
< 0, (61)
as I ′1 > 0 and collateral constraints require lR0I0,j− ρDj− I1 ≥ 0 for any I0,j in equilibrium.
Thus excess demand is strictly decreasing in p1. Furthermore, demand exceeds supply at p1,
since I1 = 0 at this price and resources must be positive for t = 1 investment to be non-zero.
To show that excess demand is negative for some p1 < ql(pi(b) − l)R0, it suffices to show
that demand is zero at this price. From the first order conditions on investment and asset
purchases at t = 1, (35) and (36), we have
ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
≤ qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j). (62)
At p1 = ql(pi(b)− l)R0, this collapses to 1 ≤ qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j), which is strict by Assumption
2 and therefore demand for assets is zero. Given that excess demand is continuous, we
conclude that an equilibrium in the asset market at t = 1 exists and is unique.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. When investment is positive, we trace out supply by considering the interior solution.
Supply and its slope are
S1 =
I1,ne,j − (1− a)lR0I0,j + ρDj
p1
(63)
S ′1 =
I ′1,ne,j
p1
− I1,ne,j
p21︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment motive
+
(1− a)lR0I0,j − ρDj
p21︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral Motive
=
I ′1,ne,j − S1
p1
. (64)
The collateral motive is always pushing the supply curve to have a negative slope when
(1− a)lR0I0,j − ρDj < 0, so that late types must raise money to cover debt. If this effect is
dominant, then the supply curve is everywhere downward sloping.
We now show that supply can be upward sloping in the range where I1,ne,j > 0. Since
I ′1,ne,j > 0, is sufficient to show that (64) can be positive at S1 = (1 − a)I0,j − lT0,j =
(1− a)(1− l)I0,j, which is the maximum value of S1 as everything is securitized.
ql(pi(b)− l)R0
c′′(I1,ne,j)p21
≥ (1− a)(1− l)I0,j. (65)
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Using p1 < ql(pi(b)− l)R0 and I0,j < wi + wint, we have the following sufficient condition
1
c′′(wi(lR0 − ρ) + wintlR0) ≥ ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− a)(1− l)(wi + wint), (66)
if c
′′′
(·) > 0. The following condition is sufficient if c′′′(·) < 0
1
c′′(0)
≥ ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− a)(1− l)(w + wint). (67)
Now, we can show that parameters exist such that the equilibrium may be constrained.
First, posit an unconstrained equilibrium in which excess demand is zero. From the first
order conditions we have
p1 =
ql(pi(b)− l)R0
qlR1 − c′(I1,j) , (68)
where I1,j = I1,e,j = I1,ne,j = lR0I0,j − ρDj, since the sales constraint is slack by assumption.
Substituting this into the individuals’ supply function gives the equilibrium quantity
S1,j =
alR0I0,j(qlR1 − c′(I1,j))
ql(pi(b)− l)R0 . (69)
If S1,j > (1 − l)(1 − a)I0,j, then the equilibrium must be constrained. The time 1 asset is
assumed to be positive NPV, so that qlR1 − c′(I1,j) > 1. Using this and simplifying gives
the following sufficient condition for a constrained equilibrium
(pi(b)− l)(1− l)
l
(1− a)
a
≤ 1
ql
. (70)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We first outline the salient features of solution to the planning problem described
in (22)-(27). It is straightforward to show that all budget and collateral constraints bind,
that no reserves are held at t = 0 and the interior solution is unique since −c′′(I0) < 0.
Combining the first order conditions on t = 1 investment gives
(1− p)(qlR1 − c′(I∗1,e)) = (1− p)(qlR1 − c′(I∗1,e)) =⇒ I∗1,e = I∗1,ne = I∗1 . (71)
Furthermore,
I1,h = (R0 − ρ)I0 + ρwint, (72)
I1,e = I1,ne = (lR0 − ρ)I0 + ρwint, (73)
where we have used D = I0 − wint. Investments at t = 0 and t = 1 are thus related as
follows:
(1− p)(lR0 − ρ)(qlR1 − c′(I∗1 )) + p(R0 − ρ)(qhR1) = c′(I∗0 ). (74)
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The planner equates the marginal cost of investment at t = 0 with the marginal benefit of
investment across the states at t = 1, where investments are equalized across intermediary
types in the low state.
Contingent Securities
We now introduce contingent securities traded at t = 0, conditional on individual type
at t = 1, when σ = l (there is no gains from trading securities that pay off when σ = h
since all intermediaries are identical in this state). Further, there is no motive for trade at
t = 1 and we ignore this possibility. The security pays the owner one unit, conditional on
σ = l and the realization of late returns. Denote by ζne and ζe the quantities of this security
purchased or sold, and ρ0 the corresponding price. The intermediaries’ problem is:
Πj = p[qhR1I1,h,j + y1,h,j] + (1− p)l[qlR1I1,e,j − c(I1,e,j) + y1,e,j]
+ (1− p)(1− l)[qlR1I1,ne,j − c(I1,ne,j) + y1,ne,j]− c(I0,j)− ρDj, (75)
subject to:
(λ0,j) I0,j + ρ0(ζne,j − ζe,j) + y0,j ≤ wint +Dj, (76)
(λ1,h,j) I1,h,j + y1,h,j ≤ R0I0,j + y0,j, (77)
(λ1,e,j) I1,e,j + y1,e,j ≤ R0I0,j − (1− l)ζe.j + y0,j, (78)
(λ1,ne,j) I1,ne,j + y1,ne,j ≤ −lζne,j + y0,j, (79)
(η1,h,j) ρDj ≤ y1,h,j, (80)
(η1,e,j) ρDj ≤ y1,e,j, (81)
(η1,ne,j) ρDj ≤ y1,ne,j. (82)
It is straight-forward to show that all budget constraints bind, y0,j = 0, and that all collateral
constraints will bind, so that y1,h,j = y1,e,j = y1,ne,j = ρDj. We can then rewrite the objective
and obtain the following necessary optimality conditions:
I0,j :pqhR1(R0 − ρ) + λ1,e,j(R0 − ρ) + λ1,ne,j(−ρ) = 0, (83)
I1,e,j :(1− p)l
[
qlR1 − c′(I∗1,e,j)
]
= λ1,e,j, (84)
I1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)
[
qlR1 − c′(I∗1,ne,j)
]
= λ1,ne,j, (85)
ζne.j :pqhR1(−ρp0) + λ1,e,j(−ρp0) + λ1,ne,j(l − ρp0) = 0, (86)
ζe.j :pqhR1(ρp0) + λ1,e,j(ρp0 − (1− l)) + λ1,ne,j(ρp0) = 0. (87)
Using (86) and (87), we obtain λ1,e,j/l = λ1,ne,j/(1 − l). Using these in the focs for t = 1
investment we obtain I∗1,e,j = I
∗
1,ne,j = I
∗
1,j, i.e. trading securities at t = 0 permits agents to
equate the marginal returns to investment at t = 1. Further, write the foc for I0,j as follows:
pqhR1(R0 − ρ) + (1− p)
[
qlR1 − c′(I∗1,j)
]
(lR0 − ρ) = c′(I∗0,j). (88)
This is identical to (74), hence the market allocation when Arrow securities are traded is
Pareto efficient.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. When a = 0 intermediaries are never constrained at t = 1. To see this, suppose they
are constrained, then by Lemma 5, they are constrained at t = 0. As a = 0, this implies that
S0,j = I0,j, but then at t = 1 early and late intermediaries have the same resources (early
types have R0(I0,j − S0,j) + lRT0,j = lRT0,j while late types have lRT0,j). This means that
there is no motive for trade at t = 1, and therefore no asset sales and hence intermediaries
are never constrained. Clearly, this implies that I∗1,e,j = I
∗
1,ne,j = I
∗
1 .
The necessary conditions for an optimum to the intermediaries’ problem can be reduced
to the following:
I0,j : (1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− l)− c′(I0,j) + λ1,h,j(R0 − ρ) + λ1,e,j(R0 − ρ) + λ1,ne,j(R0 − ρ) = 0,
(89)
I1,e,j :(1− p)lqlR1 − λ1,e,j − (1− p)lc′(I∗1 ) = 0, (90)
I1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)qlR1 − λ1,ne,j − (1− p)(1− l)c′(I∗1 ) = 0. (91)
Substituting (90) and (91) into (89), we obtain (74) from the solution to the Planner’s
problem.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof.
dΠj
dI0
=
dp1
dI0
[
µ1,T,j
p1
(1− l)T0,j
]
, (92)
where we use the market clearing condition at t = 1: lT1,e,j = −(1− l)T1,ne,j. Since the price
effect in (92) is non-zero, the equilibrium is inefficient whenever µ1,T,j > 0.
To characterize the nature of the inefficiency, note that from (92), sign(dΠ∗j/dI0) =
sign(dp1/dI0). Multiplying the market clearing condition at t = 1 by p1 and imposing
T1,ne,j = −(1− l)T0,j from the constraint gives
lT ∗1,ep1 = (1− l)2T ∗0,jp1.
Differentiating with respect to I0, and evaluating at the t = 0 equilibrium gives:
l
d(p1T
∗
1,e)
dI0
= (1− l)2
(
dT ∗0,j
dI0
p1 + T
∗
0,j
dp1
dI0
)
= (1− l)2
(
(1− a)p1 + T ∗0,j
dp1
dI0
)
,
where we have assumed that the change occurs after t = 0, but before t = 1 so that p0 is
unchanged. Hence,
dp1
dI0
=
l ((l + a(1− l))R0 − ρ)− (1− l)2(1− a)p1
l
dI∗1,e
dp1
+ (1− l)2T ∗0
. (93)
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The denominator is strictly positive since
dI∗1,e
dp1
= ql(pi(b)−l)R0
c′′(I∗1,e,j)p
2
1
> 0, where c′′ > 0. Thus, the
sign of dp1/dI0 is determined solely by the numerator. First, we characterize parameters to
support the under-investment case. Under-investment occurs when
p1 <
l ((l + a(1− l))R0 − ρ)
(1− l)2(1− a) . (94)
From Lemma 5, we know that I∗1,ne,j < I
∗
1,e,j when late sellers are constrained. Using (47)
and (48), we have the following upper bound on the price in a constrained equilibrium:
p1 < pc =
alR0
(1− a)(1− l) . (95)
Therefore, a sufficient condition for (94) is
alR0
(1− l)(1− a) <
l ((l + a(1− l))R0 − ρ)
(1− l)2(1− a) ⇐⇒ lR0 > ρ, (96)
which is the expression in Proposition 4.
Over-investment occurs when the inequality in (94) is reversed. Positive investment at
t = 1 requires p1 ≥ p1 = (pi(b)− l)R0/R1, and thus a sufficient condition for over-investment
is
(pi(b)− l)R0
R1
>
l ((l + a(1− l))R0 − ρ)
(1− l)2(1− a) . (97)
Manipulating gives
R0
R1
(pi(b)− l)(1− l)
l
(1− a)
a
>
lR0 − ρ+ a(1− l)R0
a(1− l) . (98)
Assume that
(pi(b)− l)(1− l)
l
(1− a)
a
=
1
ql
, (99)
which from (70), ensures a constrained equilibrium. Substituting (99) into (98) we have
ρ− lR0 > a(1− l)R0
(
1− 1
qlR1
)
. (100)
Since 1− 1/qlR1 < 1, the condition in Proposition 4 follows.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof.
dΠj
da
=
µ1,T,jI0,j
p1
[
(1− a)(1− l)dp1
da
− lR0 − (1− l)p1
]
, (101)
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where we have used (58), and T0,j = S0,j = (1 − a)I0,j. We ignore the price effects arising
from changes in p0, since changes to p0 have no welfare implications at the equilibrium. This
is because all intermediaries have net zero sales at t = 0, thus changes in p0 do not alter the
budget and thus do not affect investment.
The t = 1 market-clearing condition, lT ∗1,e = (1− l)T ∗1,ne can be expressed as:
l
((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − ρ) I∗0,j + rwint − I∗1,e,j
p1
= (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j. (102)
Differentiating both sides with respect to a we have:(
(1− l)R0
p1
− ((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − ρ)
p21
dp1
da
)
I∗0,j+
((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − ρ)
p1
(
∂I∗0,j
∂p1
dp1
da
+
∂I∗0,j
∂a
)
−ρwint
p21
dp1
da
− dI
∗
1,e,j/da
p1
+
I∗1,e,j
p21
dp1
da
=
−(1− l)2
l
I∗0,j +
(1− l)2(1− a)
l
(
∂I∗0,j
∂p1
dp1
da
+
∂I∗0,j
∂a
)
, (103)
where dI∗1,e,j/da =
ql(pi(b)−l)R0
p21c
′′ (I∗1,e,j)
dp1
da
. Solving for dp1
da
we have:
dp1
da
=
lR0 + (1− l)p1
(1− l)(1− a) ·
(1− l)(1− a)
(
(1− l)I∗0,j − MlR0+(1−l)p1
∂I∗0,j
∂a
)
M
∂I∗0,j
∂p1
+ lql(pi(b)−l)R0
p21c
′′ (I∗1,e,j)
+ (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j
 , (104)
where
∂I∗0,j
∂a
=
(lR0 + (1− l)p1)(1− p)(1− l)
(
ql(pi(b)−l)R0
p1
+ c
′′
neMneI
∗
0,j − (qlR1 − c′ne)
)
(1− p)(1− l)c′′neM2ne + c′′0
, (105)
∂I∗0,j
∂p1
=
−Me(1−p)lql(pi(b)−l)R0
p21
+ (1− p)(1− l)2(1− a)(qlR1 − c′ne − c′′neMneI∗0,j)
(1− p)(1− l)c′′neM2ne + c′′0
, (106)
M = (1− l)2(1− a)p1 − l((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − ρ), (107)
Me = aR0 + (1− a)lR0 − ρ, (108)
Mne = (1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ. (109)
Then,
dpij
da
> 0 when the following is true
dp1
da
>
lR0 + (1− l)p1
(1− a)(1− l) ⇐⇒ Ω ≡
(1− l)(1− a)
(
(1− l)I∗0,j − MlR0+(1−l)p1
∂I∗0,j
∂a
)
M
∂I∗0,j
∂p1
+ lql(pi(b)−l)R0
p21c
′′ (I∗1,e,j)
+ (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j
 > 1.
(110)
Using qlR1 − ql(pi(b)−l)R0p1 = c′(I∗1,e,j) from the first order conditions, rewrite Ω as
Ω =

+ φ
, (111)
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where
δ = (1− p)(1− l)c′′neM2ne + c
′′
0 > 0, (112)
 = (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j +
(1− p)(1− l)2(1− a)M
δ
(
c′e − c′ne − c
′′
neMneI
∗
0,j
)
, (113)
φ =
ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
(
(1− p)(1− l)2(1− a)M
δ
+
l
p1c
′′(I∗1,e,j)
− MMe(1− p)l
δp1
)
. (114)
Manipulation gives
φ =
(1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1δ
(
M2
p1
+
lδ
p1c
′′(I∗1,e,j)
)
> 0. (115)
M > 0 is simply the condition for over-investment, which is derived in the proof of Propo-
sition 4. Further, Mne < 0 in the over-investment case. To see this, evaluate Mne at
the maximum constrained price pc = alR0/(1 − l)(1 − a) described in (95). This gives
Mne(pc) = lR0−ρ, which must be negative in the over-investment case as shown in the proof
of Proposition 4. Thus, both  and φ are strictly positive and Ω < 1. We conclude that
the change in a does increase p1, however the price effect is insufficient and the result is a
reduction in welfare.
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